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Abstract—We present a connection establishment protocol
with integrated authentication, suited for Massive Machine-Type
Communications (mMTC). The protocol is contention-based and
its main feature is that a device contends with a unique signature
that also enables the authentication of the device towards the
network. The signatures are inspired by Bloom filters and are
created based on the output of the MILENAGE authentication
and encryption algorithm set, which is used in the authentication
and security procedures in the LTE protocol family. We show that
our method utilizes the system resources more efficiently, achieves
lower latency of connection establishment for Poisson arrivals
and allows a 87% signalling overhead reduction. An important
conclusion is that the mMTC traffic benefits profoundly from
integration of security features into the connection establish-
ment/access protocols, instead of addressing them post-hoc, which
has been a common practice.
I. INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, wireless access networks have been designed
to support a moderate number of high-rate devices. This is
contrary to setups with massive Machine-Type Communica-
tions (mMTC) supporting various Internet of Things (IoT)
services, where a large number of devices are connected to
the access point, each transmitting sporadically a small data
payload [1]. The use of traditional access protocols for mMTC
traffic results in excessive signaling overhead [2], a large share
of which is due to signaling for authentication/security.
The connection establishment protocols of cellular net-
works, such as the LTE family, are commonly connection-
oriented [3] and consist of three phases, see Fig. 1(a): (1)
Access: the devices contend for access in a random access
opportunity (RAO), which is a periodically occurring sub-
frame. (2) Authentication and Security: the device and the
network perform two-way authentication and establish the se-
curity context by encryption. (3) Radio Resource Management
(RRM) phase: the network configures the access parameters
and assigns resources for data transmission. The number of
messages per device in the first phase is variable, as the
contention outcome, dependent on the number of devices,
may imply repetition of the access phase. The number of the
messages involved in phase 2 and 3 is fixed. After all three
phases have been completed, the device can send its data.
Security in cellular access protocols is usually an “af-
terthought”, such that the related signaling is exchanged after
the radio resources are granted to a device. The protocol
efficiency, expressed as the ratio of the data vs. the signaling
exchanges, decreases significantly for small payloads, as in
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Fig. 1. (a) LTE connection establishment protocol and (b) signature-based
modification of cellular access connection establishment.
IoT/mMTC traffic. The signaling overhead can be reduced
by excluding the authentication and security and combining
the Access and RRM phases, while including a small data
payload in the signaling exchange [4]. In this paper, we take
a different approach and we integrate, instead of exclude, the
establishment of the security context with the access protocol.
In this way the security becomes native to the access protocol,
which results in significant overhead reduction. Our approach,
depicted in Fig. 1(b), achieves the same functionality as the
protocol on Fig. 1(a) in terms of radio resource reservation
and security, but with significantly less signalling. In the
proposed solution, a device contends with a unique access
signature, composed by a sequence of preambles sent over
multiple RAOs. The signature is unequivocally associated with
information that is unique to the device, such as its identity and
is used to both resolve collisions and authenticate the device
towards the network. The signatures are generated based on the
principles of Bloom filtering [5]. We show that the proposed
scheme is superior to the LTE-type connection establishment
methods in terms of latency and signaling overhead.
The use of signatures to enable non-orthogonal access
for mMTC is a major trend in 5G standardization [6]. The
scheme presented here is a conceptual extension of [7], [8].
In [7] the devices contend with random signatures, unrelated
to security. The design of signatures for the simple case of
batch arrivals, without specific investigation and realization of
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2authentication and security features, was considered in [8].
In this paper, we consider design of signatures for Poisson
arrivals, which is the standard traffic model for asynchronously
reporting devices [9], and show how to embed authentication
and security features into the contention phase. Moreover, in
respect to [8], we provide performance bounds on the protocol
overhead and access latency, as well as a detailed security
analysis of the proposed embedded authentication procedure.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II provides a
detailed description of the connection establishment protocols.
Section III describes the signature design, construction and
iterative decoding. Section IV characterizes analytically the
performance, which is verified against the simulation results
in Section V. Section VI concludes the paper.
II. CONNECTION ESTABLISHMENT PROTOCOLS
A. System Model
We focus on a single cell with a population of T Machine
Type Devices (MTDs). There is a single Base Station (BS)
that includes authentication and security features. The radio
resources are grouped in time frames. A frame is composed
of ten sub-frames of duration ts, some of which act as
RAOs and occur every δRAO sub-frames. In the following, we
describe the standard connection-establishment in LTE and in
the proposed scheme, respectively.
B. LTE Connection Establishment Protocol
1) Access: The successful completion of the Access phase,
see Fig. 1(a), entails the exchange of four messages. As
the first message, a contending MTD selects one among the
M available preambles and sends it in the next RAO. The
preambles are orthogonal to each other [10], allowing their
separation by the BS. If multiple devices send the same
preamble in the same RAO, the BS can detect that a preamble
has been sent (i.e., activated), but not by how many devices [3],
[7]. An activated preamble is (correctly) detected as active with
probability pd, while a preamble that has not been activated is
falsely detected as active with probability pf . In practice, the
target values are pd > 0.99 and pf < 10−3 [11].
For each detected preamble, the BS sends Random Access
Response (RAR) in the downlink, which contains informa-
tion about the assigned temporary network identifier and the
uplink sub-frame allocated to the subsequent message. The
contending MTDs wait for δRAR sub-frames for the RAR; and
if the RAR is not received, the access is reattempted in the
RAO within a backoff window of W sub-frames. Conversely,
the reception of the RAR triggers the transmission of the
RRC Connection Request in the allocated uplink sub-frame.
At this point, the BS is able to detect a collision among
multiple connection requests that used the same preamble and
received the same RAR. The MTDs whose connection requests
have collided, do not receive feedback. The successfully re-
ceived connection requests are acknowledged via a contention
resolution message, and the protocol transits towards the
Authentication and Security phase. In the RRC Connection
Request, the MTD informs the network of its identity and the
connection establishment cause, used by the network to check
Ciphering and Integrity established
7. Authentication Response
(f2(SK,RAND))
6. Authentication Request
(f1(SK,RAND,SQN,AMF),RAND,SQN,AMF)
12. Small data payload
(encrypted with f3 and f4)
MTD BS
Network 
Authenticated
MTD
Authenticated
MME HSS
Fig. 2. LTE authentication phase.
access authorization and subscribed services. Devices that have
not received the contention resolution message during δCR
sub-frames, re-attempt the access within the back-off window
of duration W sub-frames. In total, there can be at most R re-
attempts per device, comprising the re-attempts due to missing
RAR and due to missing contention-resolution message.
2) Authentication and Security: The device and the network
are mutually authenticated using the MILENAGE algorithm
set [12], which also establishes ciphering and integrity pro-
cedures independently at each entity, see Fig. 2. The roles of
the authentication functions f1 and f2 and the ciphering and
integrity key generating functions f3 and f4, respectively, are
described in Section II-C2.
3) RRM and Data Transmission: Prior to the data transmis-
sion, the radio access needs to be reconfigured and the network
resources assigned. This is accomplished via RRC Connection
Reconfiguration and RRC Connection Reconfiguration Com-
plete messages, see Fig. 1(a). Finally, the data, encrypted and
and with its integrity protected, is sent over the network.
C. Signature-based Connection Establishment Protocol
1) Signature Structure: The main idea of the proposed
scheme is to let devices contend with signatures that embed
authentication information, thereby integrating the access and
the authentication protocol. A signature is a combination of K
preambles transmitted over a frame of L RAOs; each preamble
of a signature is sent in a separate RAO. The number of
available signatures is
(
L
K
)
MK , potentially allowing to detect
exponentially more contenders compared to the case in which
the preambles sent over L RAOs are treated independently,
where the maximal number of detected contenders is L ·M .
We introduce the signature representation of device h as:
s(h) =
[
x
(h)
1 x
(h)
2 · · ·x(h)L
]
(1)
where x(h)i , i = 1, . . . , L, is binary word of length M + 1,
whose bit j, j = 1, . . . ,M , flags whether the j-th preamble
has been activated and the (M+1)−th bit flags the absence of
any preamble activation by device h in i-th RAO of the frame.
Since the BS detects the preamble as active if it has been sent
by any device, in the signature frame the BS observes:
y =
N⊕
h=1
sˆ(h) (2)
i.e., the observation y is the bit-wise OR of the detected
version of the signatures sˆ(h). All signatures s for which holds
s = s
⊗
y (3)
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Fig. 3. Authentication in the signature protocol.
where
⊗
is the bit-wise AND, are declared active by the BS.
Even with perfect preamble detection (pd = 1) and no false
detections (pf = 0), the BS may decode signatures that have
not been transmitted, but for which (3) also holds; i.e., there
may be false positives [7], [8]. The design and decoding of
signatures is discussed in Section III-A.
2) Access and Security Context Establishment: The
signature-based connection establishment proceeds as follows.
Via message 0, see Fig. 3, the BS informs the MTDs of the
three parameters to be used to generate their signatures; this
message can be assumed to be part of the periodic cellular
broadcasts. The parameters are: (i) the random challenge
RAND of length 128 bits; (ii) the frame length L; and (iii)
the number K of preambles in each signature.
The device starts its authentication by running the user
authentication function f2(SK(h),RAND), which outputs a
64-bit vector; we note that SK(h) is known only to the
hth MTD and the BS, via the Home Subscriber Server
(HSS). The hth MTD’s access signature is generated as
s(h)(f2(SK(h),RAND)) and sent to the BS. The BS com-
pares the received signature to the set of signatures that can
be generated by the devices in the cell, according to the
agreed RAND. This is accomplished by locally generating
s(h)(f2(SK(h),RAND)) for each MTD and then comparing
it to the set of received signatures. Upon finding a match, the
BS is able to authenticate the transmitting device1. In this way
the signature authenticates the device towards the network.
In the second step, the BS replies with the RRC Con-
nection Setup message, assigning the uplink resources to
the device. This message also includes the output of the
function f1(SK(h),RAND,SQN,AMF), as well as RAND,
SQN, and AMF.2 This information is used by the device to
authenticate the network, which is achieved by computing
locally f1(SK(h),RAND,SQN,AMF) and comparing it with
the received one.
The proposed approach reverses the mutual authentication
procedure of LTE; as at first there is device-towards-network
authentication, followed by network-towards-device authenti-
cation. With the mutual authentication in place, the device and
the network compute the Cipher Key (CK) and Integrity Key
(IK) from f3(SK(h),RAND) and f4(SK(h),RAND), respec-
1It is assumed that the probability that a signature is generated by two or
more devices is low enough, see (10).
2The inputs SQN and AMF are respectively a 48-bit sequence number
that is used to track the authentication session and a 16-bit authentication
management field [12].
tively. The protocol concludes with the transmission of the data
payload together with the RRC Connection Setup Complete
message.
III. CONSTRUCTION AND DECODING OF SIGNATURES
A. Signature Design
Inspired by Bloom filters [5], we consider a signature
construction that leverages the signature length at the expense
of introducing false positives in a controlled manner. The
probability of false positive depends on the parameters L, K,
and M . While M is fixed, L and K can be selected in a
way that, for a given access load, this probability is below
a certain threshold. Let N denote the number of correctly
decoded active signatures and P the number of false positives.
The average goodput at step 3 of the protocol in Fig. 1(b) is
E [G] = E
[
N
N + P
]
≈ E[N ]
E[N ] + E[P ]
(4)
reflecting the efficiency of the proposed access scheme, as the
BS will also attempt to serve the falsely decoded signatures.
E[N ] and E[P ] are dependent on the arrival process. We
assume that the arrival process is assumed to follow a Binomial
distribution with arrival probability pa = λ/T in each RAO,
where λ is mean number of active MTDs per RAO. Further,
the access is gated on the frame basis, such that all MTDs
that arrive during a frame transmit their signatures in the next
frame. If there is a new arrival while the MTD is currently
contending, the data in the new packet will be appended to
the data transmission upon successful completion of the con-
nection establishment protocol. Combined with the fact that
T is large, this implies that from the contention perspective,
the arrivals can be assumed to be Poisson distributed with the
expected number of arrivals per frame equal to E[N ] = λL
arrivals.3 The mean number of false positives E[P ] is
E[P ] ≈ pfa(T − E[N ]) = pfa(T − λL) (5)
where T − E[N ] is the mean number of inactive signatures,
while pfa denotes the false positive probability. Thus
E [G] ≈ λL
λL+ pfa(T − λL) ⇒ pfa =
(1− E[G])λL
E[G](T − λL) . (6)
From (6) and from the condition that a signature frame
should include at least K RAOs, the valid interval for L
is K ≤ L ≤ E[G] · T/λ. The actual value of L will
depend on the actual achievable pfa. To compute pfa, we
rely on approximations that hold when E[N ] is sufficiently
large. Specifically, pfa is the probability that all K preambles
associated with an inactive signature are detected as active.
The probability pi that a preamble in a RAO is not activated
by any active signature is:
pi =
(
1− K
LM
)λL
L→∞−→ e−λK/M (7)
3We disregard the impact of the backlog; in Section V we show that a
MTD completes the access scheme sucessfully with a very high probability,
which justifies this assumption.
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Fig. 4. Illustrative example of iterative decoding: (a) Four signatures, out
of which only two are active and the superposition of the active signatures
observed by the base station, y; (b) One RAO observed; (c) Two RAOs
observed; and (d) Three RAOs observed.
where L ·M is the total number of preambles in L RAOs,
K is the number of preamble activations per user, λL is the
average number of active signatures in the signature frame,
and where it is assumed that the selection of any preamble in
any RAO is uniformly random. Note that, when L is large, pi
does not depend on L. We approximate pfa as
pfa≈ [(1− pi)pd + pipf ]K = [pd + (pf − pd)pi]K (8)
i.e., a preamble of a falsely detected signature was either
activated by at least one device and detected with pd, or not
activated at all, but falsely detected with pf .
Assuming a goodput target Gˆ, the signature frame length L
can be obtained by combining equations (8), (7) and (6),
L =
[
pd + (pf − pd) · e−λK/M
]K
Gˆ
λ
[
1 + Gˆ
([
pd + (pf − pd) · e−λK/M
]K − 1)] · T (9)
where we note that the frame length L grows proportionally
with the cell population T .
1) Signature Construction: A signature is constructed in
two stages. Taking the view of the device h, we start with
the binary array s(h) of length L · M , indexed from 1 to
L · M , where all the bits are initially set to 0. The first
stage corresponds to the selection of the K active RAOs
using the hash functions aj(f2(SK(h),RAND)), j = 1, . . . ,K,
whose input is the device authentication function f2(...), as
discussed in Section II-C, and whose output is an integer
value between 1 and L. In the second stage, a contending
device hashes its identity using another set of independent
hash functions bj(f2(SK(h),RAND)) for each of the activated
RAOs, j = 1, . . . ,K. The hashing output is an integer between
1 and M that corresponds to the preamble that should be
sent in that RAO. Finally, K index positions are set to 1 in
s(h), where the jth index is given by aj(uh) + bj(uh). The
required hash functions aj(x) and bj(x) can be obtained from
techniques such as double hashing [13].
2) Signature Decoding: The BS iteratively decodes the
signatures based on (partial) observation after each received
RAO of the signature frame. Specifically, the BS compares
the partial observation with all valid signatures in the cell.
Any MTD whose signature is not matched, becomes removed
from the list of possible contenders. Each time a signature is
decoded, the BS informs the respective MTDs that they can
stop sending the remainder of their signatures and proceed to
phase two of the access protocol.
Fig. 4 provides an example of iterative decoding for a
population of T = 4 with N = 2, assuming that pd = 1 and
pf = 0. The output y shows what would be the observation
of the contention outcome at the BS if all RAOs of the frame
were received. After reception of RAO 1, the BS determines
that s(2) is inactive, as its first preamble is not detected
as active in that RAO. The BS also now knows that s(3)
and/or s(4) can be active. Upon receiving the RAO 2, the BS
determines that s(4) is inactive. Using this information and
information from RAO 1, the BS detects that s(3) is active
and grants access to the user, who stops transmitting. At this
moment, the BS is not yet able to determine the state of s(1),
but after RAO 3, s(1) is detected as active. This is because only
s(1) and s(3) could have activated the preamble observed in
this RAO, and, as s(3) has already been detected and stopped
transmitting, this is the evidence that s(1) is indeed active. As
by the end of the third RAO all the users have been decoded,
there is no need for the fourth RAO of the frame.
Another advantage of the iterative decoding is that decoding
instances are spread over the frame, which leads to the
spreading of the feedback messages, i.e., the RRC Connection
Setup message in Fig. 1(b). Also, a portion of the signatures
become decoded before the end of the signature frame, in
some cases without transmitting all K active preambles. The
latter phenomenon allows for lower transmission overhead and
brings additional security to the authentication procedure, as
the MTD’s full signature is not exposed.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Authentication and Security
In the following, we provide a brief discussion of the robust-
ness of the proposed authentication scheme to a eavesdropper
attack [14], [15], [16] and signature collision.
1) Eavesdropper Attack: The attacker listens to all the
traffic transmitted over the air interface. In the proposed
scheme, the attacker can observe values of RAND, L and K
that are broadcast unencrypted to all the devices prior to the
start of the signature frame, as depicted in Fig. 3, as well as
all the preambles transmitted over the signature frame. From
L and K, the attacker can estimate the number of devices that
will attempt access in the signature frame according to (9).
When iterative signature decoding is used, the attacker will not
be able to infer full signatures of all devices, as a fraction of
them become decoded before being transmitted entirely. If N
active devices send their signatures, the attacker will perceive
J ≤ K ·N active preambles across the signature frame. The
attacker cannot discern easily the valid signatures, as it will
observe
(
K·N
K
) ≥ (JK) possible signatures.
The worst case occurs when a single device sends its
entire signature, as then the attacker knows the realization
of s(h)(f2(SK(h),RAND)) for the known RAND. Yet, we
note that SK(h) is not known to the attacker and therefore
the captured signature can only be used for replay attack
in the future if that RAND occurs again, which happens
with probability 2−128. Without knowing SK(h), the attacker
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Fig. 5. Average goodput in the LTE and signature-based protocols.
cannot generate the keys CK and IK and thus cannot decrypt
the data being transmitted over the air interface. Even if
the attacker has a mechanism in place that can reverse the
signature to find out the corresponding f2(SK(h),RAND), it
still needs at least 2128 different observations to be able to
reverse f2(x) and from there determine SK(h) [17]. Hence,
the proposed scheme makes it more difficult for the attacker
to discover the actual SK(h), as the attacker needs to reverse
s(h)(f2(SK(h),RAND)), instead of only f2(SK(h),RAND), as
it is the case in LTE.
2) Collision of Signatures: Another important aspect is the
occurrence of signature collisions, which can cause the con-
nection establishment protocol to fail. The LTE authentication
function f2(SK(h),RAND) outputs a 64−bit vector, while its
inputs SK(h) and RAND are 128−bit vectors. There is a non-
zero probability that the output of f2(x) will be the same for
two or more devices, given by
pc,1 = 1− T !
(
264
T
)(
264
)−T
where 264 comes from the assumption that the output of
f2(x) is uniform [12], [17]. Furthermore, there is a non-zero
probability that two or more devices share the same signature,
given by the probability of signature collisions, pc,2, as
pc,2 = 1− T !
((L
K
)
MK
T
)[(
L
K
)
MK
]−T
(10)
and T as the total number of devices. The overall probability
of collision of the signatures from two or more devices is
pc = pc,1 + (1− pc,1)pc,2.
B. Latency and Protocol Overhead
The average latency τ observed by a contending MTD is
lower and upper bounded as
ts
L
2
≤ τ ≤ tsL
2
+ tsL (11)
where the lower bound term accounts the latency due to the
access being frame-based, while the second term in the upper
bound corresponds to the worst case, in which the signature
is decoded at the end of the frame.
As for the protocol overhead, see Fig. 1(b), the number of
protocol messages exchanged corresponds to: (1) the trans-
mission of signature preambles (up to K), (2) the resource
allocation for the small data transmission in the downlink,
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Fig. 6. Average number of message exchanges in the LTE and signature-based
protocols.
and (3) the actual data transmission. The average number of
messages exchanged, Nm, is upper bounded as,
Nm ≤ K + 2, (12)
where in the worst case the MTD will transmit the K pream-
bles of the signature. We consider these metrics for all MTDs,
regardless if they complete the access protocol successfully or
not. We provide insights on the probability of successfully
completing the access scheme in Sec. V.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
We evaluate the proposed scheme and compare it to the
existing 3GPP LTE solution for MTC traffic [4] by imple-
menting an event-driven simulator of the protocols in Fig. 1.
We consider a typical cell configuration, where a RAO occurs
every ts = 1 ms and there are M = 54 available preambles for
contention [4]. We assume different values for the population
T , where all devices have small payload and follow the arrival
model described in Sec. III-A. Upon the completion of the
connection establishment protocol and transmission of the data
payload the device will revert to idle state. Finally, we assume
that the network has enough resources to serve the devices that
have completed successfully the access protocol.
The mean number λ of arrivals per RAO is assumed to
be known and the signature frame length L, dimensioned
accordingly4. While the value of K affects the signature
frame length L, decoding latency, access reliability, signature
collisions and the number of required transmissions, we found
that a range of K ∈ [4, 10] offers good overall performance.
In this section we assume that K = 4.
The probability of preamble detection by the BS is set to
pd = 0.99 and the probability of false detection of a preamble
is set to pf = 10−3 [11]. For the LTE protocol, we assume
the typical values for the backoff window of W = 20 ms,
δRAR = 10 ms, δCR = 40 ms and the maximum number of
R = 10 connection attempts [4].
1) Average Goodput: The expected goodput E[G] is de-
picted in Fig. 5, where the signature-based access was de-
signed (i.e., L was derived from (9) for the observed λ) to
meet the goodput target Gˆ = 0.99. The simulation results
show that the proposed access method achieves a goodput
4λ can be estimated, e.g., using techniques that take advantage of the LTE
access phase such as the one proposed in [18].
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Fig. 7. Average latency in the LTE and signature-based protocols.
very close to the design target. Furthermore, the goodput
performance of the proposed method is always superior to
the LTE scheme. Specifically, in the LTE access scheme the
devices re-attempt retransmission upon colliding and until
they are either successful or the number of retransmissions
is exceeded. Each subsequent failed retransmission results in
additional wasted system resources, which degrades the LTE
goodput as λ increases.
2) Protocol Overhead: The average number of messages
exchanged for both access schemes, is depicted in Fig. 6.
We consider the full LTE protocol in Fig. 1(a) and the LTE
one optimized for MTC, where the signalling exchanges of
the authentication and security phase are omitted [4]. The
signature-based scheme, as discussed in Sec. IV-B, at most
exchanges K + 2 messages, while the number of message
exchanges in the LTE access scheme increases with the access
load. Moreover, in the LTE case for high access loads, most
of these messages correspond to connection establishment re-
attempts that are ultimately unsuccessful and do not lead to
data transmission., see Fig. 8.
3) Average Latency and Reliability: Fig. 7 compares the
mean access latency for the proposed and the LTE scheme.
Fig. 8 depicts the access reliability, i.e., the probability that
a MTD completes successfully the access and transmits its
data. As shown in Fig. 8, for higher loads the LTE access
scheme collapses, and the involved MTDs re-attempt accessing
until they exceed their allowed number of retransmissions, see
Fig. 6. This leads to a very high access latency, which does
not lead to a successful completion of the access protocol nor
data transmission. In contrast, the signature scheme ensures an
high and constant access reliability for increasing access loads,
while simultaneously offering decreasing access latency. The
latter is due to the signature frame length decreasing with λ,
c.f. (9).
VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
We have introduced the concept of access integrated authen-
tication, where devices contend with unique access signatures
that allow the authentication of the devices to occur implicitly
with the access. These signatures are constructed following
the principles of Bloom filters, and provide probabilistic
performance guarantees. The proposed access method uses the
system resources very efficiently and outperforms the LTE
baseline in terms of protocol overhead, latency and access
reliability.
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Fig. 8. Average access reliability in the LTE and signature-based protocols.
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